INTRODUCTION 185

I. ECONOMICS AND COPYRIGHT LAW: THE BEGINNING 188

II. COPYRIGHT, GDP, AND JOBS: THE MACROECONOMIC TURN 192

III. THE ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT: MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS 205
A. Copyright in Economic Theory 205
B. The Empirical Evidence on Copyright 207

CONCLUSION: SKEPTICISM OF ECONOMIC CLAIMS ABOUT COPYRIGHT 212

Economic analysis has long been used to justify copyright regulation. Long before the Statute of Anne, the Stationer’s Guild told the story of the copying competitor, who in the absence of regulation, would copy every original book and offer it for less. In the story, the coping competitor would, in the absence of regulation, deprive the original author of an opportunity to recoup their authorship investment, and so lead to a world where no books at all would be published. To ensure sufficient incentives for authorship, some degree of copyright regulation was thought essential. At the same time, in the traditional account, too much copyright would unduly raise the prices for, or otherwise limit access to, creative works. In combination, these two concerns led to the familiar balance between incentives and access. In the 1950s, William Blaisdell of the Copyright Office eschewed this traditional economic framework and offered an alternative economic justification for copyright: Copyright creates national wealth. Later work built on his approach to argue that copyright creates jobs and a favorable balance of trade as well. This article critiques Blaisdell’s approach and shows that the argument that copyright creates national wealth or jobs or a favorable balance of trade is without merit.